

The War on Drugs. An Example of Global Injustice

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ABSTRACT

This article argues that the War on Drugs (WOD) is globally unjust because states violate their negative duty to not harm people by imposing a coercive institutional order in which the object of human rights is not secure to all members of society.

Using Plan Colombia as a case study and Thomas Pogge's global justice theory, the article examines how militarized drug strategies, promoted by the United States and adopted by Colombia, have led to human rights violations without achieving the desired goal of ending drug trafficking. The analysis shows that the WOD criminalizes vulnerable communities affected by poverty, state neglect, and armed conflict. Moreover, these policies fail to address the structural causes of drug production and trafficking, reinforce global inequalities rooted in colonial disparities and exploitation, and do not confront the impact of demand from the Global North. Altogether, it led to the deprivation of the object of human rights of Colombians.

The article proposes alternative approaches based on harm reduction, respect for human rights, a global commitment to distributive justice, and combat inequalities in the global economic order. Some are equal participation of states in global anti-drug law, legalization of personal doses, proscribing military strategies, investing in health programs focused on prevention and consumption, prohibition of forced eradication of illegal crops, and promoting aid programs to farmers that cut dependency to illegality.

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Ultimately, the WOD cannot be won through only military means; only a shift toward global justice and harm reduction offers a viable path forward.

Keywords: cosmopolitanism, global distributive justice, global drug policy, human rights, state accountability

La guerra contra las drogas. Un ejemplo de injusticia global

RESUMEN

Este artículo sostiene que la guerra contra las drogas (WOD, por sus siglas en inglés) es globalmente injusta, ya que los Estados violan su deber negativo de no causar daño al imponer un orden institucional coercitivo en el que el objeto de los derechos humanos no está garantizado para todos los miembros de la sociedad.

Utilizando el Plan Colombia como estudio de caso y la teoría de justicia global de Thomas Pogge, el artículo examina cómo las estrategias antidrogas militarizadas, promovidas por Estados Unidos y adoptadas por Colombia, han conducido a violaciones de derechos humanos sin lograr el objetivo de acabar con el narcotráfico.

El análisis muestra que la WOD criminaliza a comunidades vulnerables afectadas por la pobreza, el abandono estatal y el conflicto armado. Además, estas políticas no abordan las causas estructurales de la producción y el tráfico de drogas, refuerzan desigualdades globales arraigadas en disparidades coloniales y explotación, y no enfrentan el impacto de la demanda proveniente del norte global. En conjunto, esto ha llevado a la privación del objeto de los derechos humanos de los colombianos.

El artículo propone enfoques alternativos basados en la reducción de daños, el respeto por los derechos humanos, un compromiso global con la justicia distributiva y la lucha contra las desigualdades en el orden económico mundial. Algunas medidas incluyen la participación equitativa de los Estados en la legislación antidrogas global, la legalización de dosis personales, la proscripción de estrategias militares, la inversión en programas de salud enfocados en la prevención y el consumo, la prohibición de la erradicación forzada de cultivos ilegales, y la promoción de programas de ayuda a agricultores que reduzcan la dependencia de economías ilegales.

Finalmente, la WOD no puede ganarse únicamente mediante medios militares; solo un cambio hacia la justicia global y la reducción de daños ofrece un camino viable hacia adelante.

Palabras clave: cosmopolitanismo, justicia global distributiva, política global de drogas, responsabilidad estatal.

1. INTRODUCTION

During his first speech at the United Nations (UN), Gustavo Petro Urrego, President of Colombia, called to end the War on Drugs (WOD) that punishes farmers, stigmatizes native communities, and destroys the environment, but does not address the role of the market, and demand in the Global North. He proposed a new approach that

protects human life and the environment, diminishes consumption, and combats soft and artificial drugs (CNN en Español, 2022). This marks the first time a Head of State from Colombia, and one of the few from the Global South, has openly rejected the WOD.

According to the World Drug Report 2022 (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC], 2022a), North America and Western Europe remain the main consumer markets, cannabis and opioids are the most used drugs, whereas the latter is responsible for 77% of drug-related deaths, and illegal coca cultivation and cocaine production has increased since 2020. Furthermore, the WOD has led to massive violations of human rights, including abuse of the death penalty, torture, unlawful imprisonment, extra-judicial killings, and unfair trials (United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner [OHCHR], 2023), as well as higher prison sentences for drug-related crimes than for murder or rape in both the Global North and South (Durán-Martínez, 2021). Conversely, the World Drug Report 2024 (UNODC, 2024) shows an increase in the production and consumption of synthetic drugs such as amphetamines and methamphetamines, as well as opioids for medical use in regions like North America, Europe and Australia. However, the prohibitionist punitive approaches have not changed much. This evolving landscape underscores the urgent need to develop a human rights-centered drug policy that address both the health and social dimensions of drug use, and combats the new challenges that drug-trafficking and production, especially regarding synthetic drugs, arise in both the Global North and South.

What are the moral implications of a policy that causes harm? Following Peter Singer (1972), people have the moral duty to prevent bad things from happening as long as they do not cause equal or greater harm. Moreover, Thomas Pogge (2008) asserts that states have the duty to not harm people, and should not constrain access to the objects of human rights, such as basic necessities. Therefore, states and other social agents directly or indirectly involved in depriving people's human rights have a moral responsibility to fulfill the duties attached to them (Ashford, 2007).

Based on this framework, this article argues that the War on Drugs is globally unjust because states violate their negative duty to not harm people by imposing a coercive institutional order in which the object of human rights is not secure to all members of society. The latter can only be achieved by a commitment to global distributive justice that tackles the root causes of the problem, does not engage nor encourage official disrespect of human rights, and offers legitimate and sustainable development solutions. To support this argument, the article is supported by key political theorists such as Pogge and Singer. It will first examine the history of the WOD, focusing on the Colombian case and its consequences. Second, it will analyze how this policy

promotes official disrespect of human rights, imposes a coercive institutional order, and deprives people the access to their human rights. Third, it will critically assess alternative solution approaches that confront demand-side issues, and offer development options to farmers. Finally, it will summarize key points that open to broader discussion on race, development and justice.

2. THE HISTORY OF THE WAR ON DRUGS

The WOD is a series of anti-drug policies launched by Richard Nixon, President of the United States (US), in 1971 that seeks to reduce the production, traffic, and consumption of drugs by prohibiting and confiscating specific substances, such as cocaine or heroin; increasing penalties of drugs-related offenses; eradicating coca and poppy crops; and stigmatizing consumers (Britannica, 2023). The crack epidemic broke during the 1980s, and the official response was the 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act. This increased funds for drug-fighting, whilst those for rehabilitation programs decreased; crack users, mostly African Americans, had higher penalties than white cocaine users, thus prompting a sentencing disparity based on race; and drug enforcement law prosecuted more crack users regardless of a higher number of cocaine users (American Civil Liberties Union [ACLU], 2006). Nonetheless, drug use and deaths increased, violence spread, and drug production was displaced mainly to Southeast Asia and South America (Friesendorf, 2007).

Later on, this domestic initiative became the dominant force of the International Drug Control Regime (IDCR), a set of agreements on how the drug problem should be controlled nationally and internationally (Idler & Garzón Vergara, 2021a). The WOD transformed into a global policy based on securitization, an approach sustained on three assumptions: drugs are depicted as an existential threat to national security, this demands states should adopt militarized strategies, and policies are led by the Global North and imposed on the Global South (Idler, 2021). Additionally, the US has carried out treaties that benefit its interests, regardless of respect for human rights (Friesendorf, 2007). One example is Plan Colombia.

During the 1980s, the drug industry flourished in Colombia under Cartel de Medellín and Cartel de Cali, and by the late 1990s, it funded old guerrillas and new paramilitary groups; influenced national politics, such as allegedly funding the election of President Ernesto Samper in 1994; and led to Colombia producing 80% of cocaine, consumed mostly in the US (Friesendorf, 2007). Consequently, Plan Colombia was implemented from 2000 to 2015 as an anti-drug combined effort to reduce 50% of illegal crops and cocaine production, fight insurgency, and promote economic and social justice (Franz, 2016).

The results were different than expected. Firstly, aerial fumigation was used to reduce coca crops in the country from 160,000 hectares in 2000 to 80,000 in 2006 (Franz, 2016). Later on, both aerial fumigation and manual eradication reduced the illegal coca area to 47,788 hectares in 2012 (UNODC, 2022b). This may prove that both aerial fumigation and manual eradication are effective mechanisms to reduce illegal coca crops in the country. However, the National Narcotics Council (*Consejo Nacional de Estupefacientes* in Spanish) stopped the use of aerial fumigation of glyphosate in 2015, and the Constitutional Court did the same in 2017; since then, coca crops increased and reached a peak of 180,00 hectares in 2019 (Fundación Ideas para la Paz, 2025; UNODC, 2022b). The price of coca leaves boosted, crops moved to southern Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia, and Colombia remained the main supplier of cocaine (Franz, 2016).

Second, specialized training and better weapons enhanced the police and armed forces' capabilities in combating illegal actors (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica [CNMH], 2013). This resulted in a reduction of the guerrillas' control over the territory, a decrease in their numbers, and the dismantling of the United Self-Defense of Colombia (*Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia*, in Spanish), the biggest paramilitary group (Franz, 2016). Nevertheless, the vacuum of power was partially filled with other illegal organizations, the weakened guerrillas withdrew to remote areas away from state control, and the armed forces colluded with paramilitaries to commit massive violations against human rights (Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz [JEP], 2022).

Third, a reduction of violence led to a more stable economy that attracted foreign capital, especially in the hydrocarbon sector, whilst forced displacement and eradication of illegal crops resulted in more impoverishment of the society (CNMH, 2013). Drugs-related crimes were severely punished, but only 2% of inmates were medium or high-ranking members of drug organizations (Durán-Martínez, 2021). Conversely, armed conflict-related crimes were mostly unpunished and its victims sought justice through international organizations (CNMH, 2013). For instance, the Colombian state was condemned thirteen times for violations against human rights that took place from 1980 to 2012 (Cuastumal Madrid, 2013).

On the other hand, Plan Colombia was regarded as an example of development success. For instance, homicides decreased by 50%, while kidnapping and terrorists attacked decreased by 90%; Colombian and American military forces have become regional security partners, with joint training and operational exercises; and US business operation have increased (USGLC, 2016). This shows a clear contrast between the American perspective and the Colombian reality that fails to address all the consequences, including the violations against human rights, and questioning

the strategies implemented to combat drug production in Colombia and drug consumption in the US.

Despite not meeting its goals, the WOD has not drastically changed over time. The Political Declaration and Plan of Action on International Cooperation Towards an Integrated and Balanced Strategy to Counter the World Drug Problem of 2009 kept this approach and set a 10-year evaluation period of the goals that were renewed in 2014 without an assessment of its achievements (Idler & Garzón Vergara, 2021a). Colombia, Guatemala, and Mexico called to integrate development solutions and the protection of human rights in anti-drug law, whilst Bolivia defended the right of native communities to use and cultivate coca according to their traditions (Koram, 2022). These approaches were dismissed until the international community agreed in 2019 that the protection of human rights, reduce harm, and support of the Sustainable Development Goals must be included (Idler & Garzón Vergara, 2021a).

3. CONTESTING THE MORALITY OF THE WAR ON DRUGS

3.1. Promotion of official disrespect for human rights

Plan Colombia illustrates how the WOD is a securitized policy that endorses official disrespect of human rights. It occurs when the government enforces laws that deprive people of their human rights, fails to proscribe such laws, or when it allows impunity for violations committed by their agents and institutions (Pogge, 2008). In this understanding, human rights are claims that all people equally have based on their humanity and dignity and involve the moral duty to not harm nor deprive people access to their basic necessities (Ashford, 2008). Subsequently, any deprivation carries out the moral responsibility to fulfill and correct the wrongs.

Harm can be caused by acts, omissions, and social institutions (Pogge, 2007). First, interactional harm through acts happens when agents are aware that their actions will undoubtedly lead to deprivation of people's human rights, or when the rules force agents to do so (Pogge, 2007). On one hand, Plan Colombia also destined a budget to economic and social aid, including alternative development, governance and the rule of law, human rights protection, victim assistance and reintegration, economic growth, investing in rural infrastructure, market access, and small business development (Departamento Nacional de Planeación [DNP], 2016; Comisión de la Verdad, 2020;). On the other hand, the armed forces' success in fighting the insurgency was measured by combat casualties (CNMH, 2013). Nevertheless, the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (*Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz*, in Spanish) found that between 2002 and 2008, the armed forces, along with paramilitaries, committed

6,402 extra-judicial killings, which is the murder of civilians, dressed up as guerrilla members and presented as combat casualties in exchange of vacations or promotions, whilst refusal often resulted in penalizations (JEP, 2022). Altogether, the government failed to uphold its duty to not harm its citizens because it targeted and killed them to achieve strategic goals.

Second, harm happens when agents omit to fulfill their duty not to harm people or remain passive when third parties cause it (Pogge, 2007). Aerial fumigation with glyphosate was used to eradicate coca crops, but it caused health problems in the communities, altered their environment, and destroyed both legal and illegal crops that represented the farmers' livelihoods (WWF, 2022). Despite reports of the affectation on the population, the government maintained the practice until the Constitutional Court suspended it in 2015 (Sedano, 2022). Overall, the government remained passive before a policy that proved with time to be harmful to the citizens, did not provide alternatives to illegal activities that secure farmers' access to their socioeconomic rights and was not accountable for the harm.

Third, social institutions cause harm through a set of rules that impose constraints on securing access to human rights, and national policies have little affectation on a global order that imposes views, habits, and norms (Pogge, 2007). Plan Colombia was designed and executed following the securitization approach of the US anti-drug law, which linked to the armed conflict, prompted massive violations of human rights to achieve standards set by the US in the WOD (CNMH, 2013). The consequences, however, constrained even more the farmers' access to their human rights: they were victimized, the harm was not recognized, and no reparation was offered.

These patten of harm —interactional, omissive, and institutional — reveal how the WOD, through initiative such as Plan Colombia, systematically undermines the moral and legal foundation of human rights. Moreover, it creates a coercive institutional order that reflects deeper structural inequalities and the need to transform them rooted in human dignity and accountability.

3.2. Imposition of a coercive institutional order

Violations against human rights happen within coercive social orders, in which some people's freedoms are deprived, the access to their basic necessities is not secure, and they lack any kind of compensation or protection against further deprivation (Pogge, 2008). Plan Colombia showed that achieving goals on fighting drugs, such as eradication of crops or combat casualties, led to constraining the socioeconomic rights of farmers (CNMH, 2013). Additionally, aerial fumigation with glyphosate caused health problems in the communities, altered their environment, and destroyed both

legal and illegal crops that represented the farmers' livelihoods (Camacho & Mejía, 2017). Therefore, the WOD imposed a coercive institutional order in Colombia.

It could be contested that Colombia agreed to it, and was the sole responsible for all the violations of human rights in its territory. Nonetheless, consent is questionable because people did not agree on constraining access to their human rights (Pogge, 2007). Even though farmers found in coca crops a relief from extreme poverty, Plan Colombia led to their forced eradication, stigmatization by legal and illegal actors, and forced displacement (CNMH, 2013). Furthermore, consent weakens when given under calamitous circumstances, especially if the receptor has played a part in creating such circumstances (Pogge, 2007). Colombia produced most of the cocaine consumed in the US markets, which jeopardized American interests and urged Colombia to implement stricter measures toward anti-drug law (Franz, 2016). In 1998, the US denied certification for failing to meet commitments to fighting drugs (Friesendorf, 2007), thus holding monetary aid. Nevertheless, Colombia obtained certification after Plan Colombia began and has been renewed yearly with the obligation of fighting drugs by US standards (Gómez Maseri, 2022).

Moreover, the coercive order of the WOD reproduces structural injustice rooted in the inequalities of the global economic order. Following Iris Young (2011), structural injustice is a moral wrong that arises from social, political, or economic structures in which states pursue their interests to the detriment of others. It is morally wrong because the structures enrich some states whilst depriving others, do not recognize the disparity and impose burdens unequally, and collective actions of everyday life keep reproducing the inequalities (Parekh, 2020).

Colonization and slavery created a separation between colonies and colonial powers which sustained the latter's power and wealth in the exploitation of the colonies' natural resources and political control of their institutions (Pogge, 2001). For the Global South, this resulted in poverty, weak state institutions, and dependency on the Global North's economy. In Colombia, wealth was tied to land ownership and its unequal distribution has been one of the catalysts of war, including the current armed conflict (Colmenares, 2021). The state developed around the cities and exercised weak control of the territory; hence, could not secure access to basic necessities for a large part of its population (CNMH, 2013). For instance, 19.2% of Colombians live in extreme poverty, and 39.8% in poverty (EFE, 2022), whilst healthcare, sanitation, education, security, employment, and justice were provided by non-state actors (CNMH, 2013). All of the above led to the development of illegal economies around coca crops and cocaine production; demand from the US only increased the revenues and encouraged the production and traffic of cocaine (Franz, 2016).

The economic global order gives the US privilege to control the global market, differentiate legal from illegal drugs, and alter their approach worldwide. Despite the alarming abuse of opioids that led to three epidemics since the 1990s (Deweerd, 2019), these drugs are not equally combated by the WOD. Big pharmaceutical companies hold economic power that influences policymakers in the US, promote their product in the media, and monetarily incentivize doctors to prescribe opioids (Deweerd, 2019). Demand has not been questioned, and its abuse has been portrayed in media and by the government as the drama of the white, middle-class, suburban youngsters whose lives ended by “dirty doctors”, as well as African American and Hispanic dealers (Netherland & Hansen, 2016). In consequence, the WOD is also supported by a moral narrative that emphasizes the purity and vulnerability of a dominant group that seeks compassion and solidarity (Woods, 2012). The identification of the white as the vulnerable in need justifies any means used by the WOD worldwide if can it end the perceived suffering.

In sum, the WOD imposes a coercive institutional order and reproduces historical and structural injustices that disproportionately affect marginalized communities. This prompts the need to critically examine the moral narratives and power structures that sustain anti-drug policies worldwide, and to convey alternative frameworks that prioritize human rights, public health and social justice.

3.3. Deprivation of human rights

The violation of human rights occurs on two levels: in the economic global order, and the WOD. The current economic global order is the result of social, political, and economic structures from the past that developed and sustained present inequalities. In Colombia, farmers’ human rights to basic necessities were constrained because of the historical disparities in land ownership, state abandonment of the countryside, the political exclusion that caused an armed conflict, and unfair trade policies (Colmenares, 2021). Therefore, farmers had no secure access to healthcare, education, sanitation, justice, or economic opportunities for development (CNMH, 2013).

Additionally, the WOD’s coercive institutional order-imposed strategies for fighting the drug industry that ultimately affected the farmers and other impoverished communities. Under Plan Colombia, they were targeted as the enemy and were subject to massacres, forced displacement, and extrajudicial killings (CNMH, 2013). Farmers resorted to illegal coca crops to avoid starvation, but aerial fumigation eradicated both legal and illegal crops and the government did not offer economic alternatives (WWF, 2022). In consequence, to escape poverty more people resorted to drug

traffic in the cities, or abroad as mules, which are people used for smuggling drugs across borders (UNODC, 2012).

Altogether, global structures create inequalities around the world, such as poverty, that lead to constraining access to people's human rights. Therefore, people have resorted to illegal activities to sustain themselves and their families, which in the context of weak state institutions, is the catalyst of drug industries. The demand from affluent countries, the non-existent accountability of big pharmaceutical companies, and a racialized portrayal of users prompt the WOD to fight symptoms and not the root causes of the problem. In the end, both orders combine and already vulnerable people are twice victimized.

4. ALTERNATIVES: FROM COERCION TO HARM REDUCTION

The WOD has failed at reducing the production, traffic, and consumption of drugs worldwide (UNODC, 2022a). Conversely, its coercive approach has resulted in massive violations of human rights (UNODC, 2012); hence, any alternative must aim at harm reduction. From a political theory perspective, states have the duty to not harm people and secure people's access to the object of their human rights (Pogge, 2008), such as basic necessities. If the actions of the states or their institutions cause harm, they must uphold their duty and change the order in which people's human rights are constrained. Harm reduction, then, advocates for reducing the negative impacts the prohibition of drugs has on society (Bacon, 2016). However, this approach has only been used in the control of abuse of certain substances, such as opioids, or diseases, such as AIDS (Drucker, 2013), and has been portrayed as colluding with crime in the Global North, where it has been implemented (Bacon, 2016). Therefore, the states have the moral duty to correct the harm caused by the WOD to all people, by securing access to their human rights.

Now, how could this be achieved? First, military strategies should be proscribed, and the police forces should be the sole responsible for combating the drug industry (Friesendorf, 2007). The use and traffic of substances, among other drug-related crimes, should be standardized to avoid racial disparities in the penitentiary system (ACLU, 2006). Furthermore, these sentences should not surpass those for other crimes and national laws should promote alternatives to punishment, such as the legalization of personal doses of drugs (Durán-Martínez, 2021).

Second, forceful eradication must stop because it damages the environment and makes the communities sick (Camacho & Mejía, 2017), and aid based on eradication goals promotes corruption among high official members of governments

(Friesendorf, 2007). Increase the investment in health programs targeted at preventing and managing consumption (Drucker, 2013). Moreover, pharmaceutical companies must be clear about the content and consequences of their products, and national legislation should address the specific use of medical drugs to avoid misuse and abuse (Deweerd, 2019). Now, since the elimination of aerial fumigation and solely manual eradication, illegal coca crops have risen due several reasons, including mistrust in the State (Rueda, 2025). This has prompt new discussions regarding the use of glyphosate and its negative consequences in order to comply with the WOD and numbers.

Third, states should be committed to distribute global justice that combat inequalities of the global economic order that originate and fuel the drug problem. This approach refers to moral principles about the process of the global distribution of goods and resources, such as healthcare, education, income, and food (De Bres, 2012). Injustice structures since colonial times have created exploitation of the Global South's natural resources and enrichment of the Global North resulting in poverty and weak welfare states (Young, 2011), and these structures have been reproduced in the current economic order through tax barriers, and unfair trade agreements (Pogge, 2001). On top of that, the WOD condemned the Global South for its role in the cultivation, production, and traffic of drugs, but does not hold the Global North accountable for the demand for drugs, the imposition of coercive policies that have caused violations of human rights (Idler & Garzón Vergara, 2021b), and its role in sustaining the root causes, such as poverty (Pogge, 2001). Therefore, alternative solutions must first address the unequal relation between countries and change it. Punctually, all states should equally participate in the decision-making of anti-drug laws under the supervision and coordination of the UN, whilst proscribing individual states from unilaterally imposing economic, political, or military sanctions to accept agreements under any circumstances (Friesendorf, 2007).

Fourth, controlled legalization to reduce revenue and combat other illegal markets, such as arms trade, terrorism, and human trafficking. Following Jenner (2011), drug trafficking profits, estimated at \$500 billion, often fund criminal organizations. Therefore, less income from the illegal drug industry would diminish other illegal markets. Although this could become a reality, it would not happen at once. On one hand, illegal actors would fight the government and each other for the control of drugs, its production and traffic. On the other hand, in countries such as Colombia legalization should be aligned with other ways to combat insurgency, control the territory and provide citizens nationwide with the access to their human rights, including education, services, security, health and services. Moreover, Noriega (2024) also point out that Colombian society is overall against legalization, regardless

of its possible positive outcomes; therefore, it makes it harder for the government to support it.

Fifth, this article suggests the creation of an international aid program to fund alternative economic schemes in impoverished regions of the world that depend on illegal activities related to the drug industry, following the Colombian example of crop substitution. In conflict zones, such as Colombia, this requires extra efforts to strengthen state institutions and reduce the power of non-state actors, protect social leaders, and impose penalties against effective compliance. Moreover, revenues from legalization and saving from military investment can be used to fund aid programs aiming at combating inequalities in needed places from the Global South or poor neighborhoods from the Global North, where the drug industry takes advantage of (Koram, 2022). Align anti-drug policies to the sustainable development of the communities and international guidelines on the protection of human rights (Idler & Garzón Vergara, 2021b), and thoughtfully apply it.

5. CONCLUSION

The article argued that the WOD is globally unjust because states violate their negative duty to not harm people by imposing a coercive institutional order in which the object of human rights is not secure to all members of society. To support this argument, the article first examined the history of the WOD. This was launched in 1971 by US President Richard Nixon and sought to reduce the production, traffic, and consumption of drugs. This policy depicted drugs as a threat to national security that demanded the enforcement of military strategies, along with the prohibition of specific drugs, high penalties for drug-related crimes, and combating supply worldwide. One regional example is Plan Colombia, which was deployed from 2000 to 2015 to tackle the elevated supply of cocaine to American markets by reducing coca crops and cocaine production, fighting insurgency, and bringing social and economic justice to Colombia. Nevertheless, coca crops initially reduced but increased since 2013, insurgency retreated due to the enhancement of the public forces' capabilities, massive violations of human rights were committed by the state and its institutions, and drug-related crimes were severely punished in the low ranks.

Second, it analyzed how this policy promotes official disrespect of human rights, imposes a coercive institutional order, and deprives people the access to their human rights. The WOD depicts them as threats to national security that must be combated through military strategies. Under Plan Colombia, these resulted in violations of human rights, such as extra-judicial killings, massacres, and forced displacement, yet the government did not change the law, punish the responsible agents, or

discourage the continual practices. Moreover, victims were vulnerable communities, whose access to their basic necessities of healthcare, education, security, or justice was already constrained by poverty, state neglect, and finding themselves amidst the armed conflict. Even though the Colombian state is directly responsible for these violations, the US urged to fight drugs on its terms under the risk of losing aid. Altogether, previous conditions, reinforced by the WOD, led to the deprivation of the object of human rights of Colombians.

Third, it assessed alternative solution schemes that confront demand-side issues, and offer development options to farmers. Solutions must promote harm reduction, respect for human rights, a global commitment to distributive justice, and combat inequalities in the global economic order. Some actions include equal participation of states in global anti-drug law under the coordination of the UN, international standard of sentences, legalization of personal doses, proscribing military strategies, investing in health programs focused on prevention and consumption, prohibition of forced eradication of illegal crops, and promoting aid programs to farmers that cut dependency to illegality. Furthermore, global structures that led to poverty, weak state institutions, and hunger must be eliminated.

In conclusion, the WOD is an immoral policy inserted in a global order that creates and reproduces inequalities, which deprives access to the basic necessities of millions around the world. All agents directly and indirectly involved must commit to overcoming structural injustices. Ultimately, the WOD cannot be won through only military means; only a shift toward global justice and harm reduction offers a viable path forward.

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